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I. INTRODUCTION
The subprime lending business has seen explosive growth over
the past few years. National subprime loan volume was $90 billion in
1995 and is expected to reach $175 billion by the end of 1998.1 This
growth, along with recent economic developments, has caused changes
in the composition of the subprime lending industry. This is a trend
that seems certain to continue. One of the most important changes is
the increased participation of banks in the subprime market. On
March 4, 1998, First Union2 agreed to pay $2.1 billion to purchase
The Money Store, one of the largest subprime lenders in the country.3
This Note will examine the banking industry's entrance into
the subprime lending market by utilizing First Union's acquisition of
The Money Store as a point of reference. Part II of this Note will
provide a brief description of the mechanics underlying the business of
subprime lending.4 Part III will discuss recent trends that have
adversely affected the subprime lending industry.5 Part IV will use
First Union's acquisition of The Money Store to illustrate the banking
industry's interest in becoming more involved in subprime lending. 6
Part V will discuss the reaction of bank regulatory agencies to the
increasing activity of banks in this arena. 7 Finally, in Part VI the Note
will conclude that First Union's acquisition of The Money Store
1.See Susan Schweers, Mortgage Women Explore B&C Market, REAL EST. FIN.
TODAY, THE ELECTRONIC EDITION, May 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7566615.
2. At the end of 1998, First Union was the sixth largest bank in the United States,
with a total of $225 billion in assets. See Ken Elkins, Wait and See, Bus. J. (Charlotte),
Dec. 28, 1998, at 18.
3. See Fishing Downmarket, ECONOMIST, March 7, 1998, at 81. In 1997, The
Money Store originated $7.2 billion in loans. In 1996, the figure was $5.7 billion and in
1995, $3.8 billion. See Mark Anderson, Money Store's Moves Have Been Good As Gold,
SACRAMENTO Bus. J., Nov. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20241428.
4. See infra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 64-115 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 116-145 and accompanying text.
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should serve as a positive example of the type of consolidation that
will likely occur in the subprime lending industry. 8
II. A PRIMER ON SUBPRIME LENDING
Subprime companies 9 lend to consumers who generally cannot
get a more "conventional" loan.'o There are three broad categories of
persons who turn to the subprime market for a loan. The first group is
borrowers who have blemishes in their credit history." These
customers have one or more of the following on their credit report:
multiple delinquencies, charge-offs, repossessions, bankruptcies, or
low household annual income.'" The second group of subprime
borrowers turns to the subprime market because they have very little
8. See infra notes 146-174 and accompanying text.
9. Mortgage and home equity loans account for 60% of the subprime market. See
Karen Hube, In the Wild West of Subprime Lending, Borrowers Have to Dodge Many
Bullets, WALL ST. J., March 18, 1998, at Cl. An example of a subprime mortgage loan
is the loan given to Mary Margaret Traxler, by Charlotte based EquiFirst Corp. See
Christina Brinkley, Mortgage Lenders Pursue Once-Shunned Borrowers, WALL ST. J.
(Florida Journal), Sept. 11, 1996, at Fl, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 11797858. Ms.
Traxler was given a loan for the down payment as well as the balance of the $89,000
purchase price of her home. See id. The interest rate on the down payment loan was
15.9% and the interest on the balance was 13.29%. See id. With subprime interest rates
this high, as compared to a 7% or 8% rate on a conventional mortgage loan, it is no
wonder that subprime lending is a lucrative business. Home equity loans are growing at
the phenomenal rate of 15% each year even though these loans have interest rates that
average between 13% and 15%. See Jessica Skelly, Risky Business, RETAIL BANKER
INT'L, March 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10785388. Borrowers are willing to pay
15% on a home equity loan only because credit cards carry a higher rate. See id. Auto
loans are also a component of the market. See generally R. Carter Pate et al., Subprime
Auto Finance: The Year of the Bankruptcies, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1998, available
in LEXIS, Bkrtcy Library, Abij File (discussing recent problems in the subprime auto
lending business). High loan-to-value (HLTV) home equity loans are not actually
subprime products. See Amy I. Stickel, Buying a High-Risk Home Lender? Take Note!,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS REP., July 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10104910. In an
HLTV loan, the borrower may receive a loan for up to 150% of the house's value. See
id. Since there is not enough collateral to back the entire loan, only good credit risks can
qualify, and thus HLTV loans are not geared toward the subprime market. See id.
Therefore, these loans will not be discussed extensively in this Note, although many of the
same issues that arise in the HLTV market also arise in the subprime market.
10. However, some evidence suggests that some consumers are paying much higher
fees and interest than is necessary. According to Freddie Mac, 35% of those mortgage
borrowers who obtained loans in the subprime market, could have qualified for a lower-
rate, more conventional loan. See Hube, supra note 9, at Cl.
11. See Pate et al., supra note 9.
12. See id.
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credit history. 13  Among those in this category are the recently
divorced who have no independent credit history and recent graduates
from high school or college. 4 The third group of subprime borrowers
is composed of individuals who have become over-indebted and thus
cannot qualify for additional credit in the prime market."5 Overall,
about 25% of Americans have the type of negative credit history that
forces them to rely on subprime options. 16
Subprime lenders charge much higher interest and fees than
conventional lenders.17  Charging higher interest rates and fees can
lead to much higher profit margins in the subprime industry. 18  The
increased costs associated with subprime loans are the result of three
factors. First, subprime lenders must charge higher interest and fees
to compensate them for the increased risk that subprime borrowers
will default.' 9 Second, borrowers turn to the subprime market out of
necessity and thus must pay whatever the market will bear in order to
obtain credit.20 Third, servicing subprime loans requires more labor
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Hube, supra note 9, at Cl. Many of these borrowers are happy just to get
any additional credit at all. See id. However, there is evidence to suggest that some
customers may be paying higher interest than they have to. See id.
16. See Carol Frey, Subprime Time for Borrowers Isn't Now as Credit Tightens,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Oct. 30, 1998, at ID (citing Jeffrey Zeltzer, executive
director of the National Home Equity Mortgage Association). Customers with a credit
rating below A- are deemed subprime. See id. Credit ratings are based on a variety of
factors including debt-to-income ratio, stability of employment, income, assets, number of
late payments, and bankruptcy. See id.
17. See Brinkley, supra note 9, at Fl. Interest rates may be as high as 30% in some
states. See id. Often origination fees are 5-10% of the loan. See id. There may also be
additional charges for insurance, title searches, and other expenses associated with a loan.
See id.
18. See Howard Schneider, Key Trends in Subprime, MORTGAGE BANKING, April
1998, at 15, 17. Profit margins on conventional mortgages will be approximately twenty
to thirty-five basis points (0.2% to 0.35%), but around 250 to 350 basis points (2.5% to
3.5%) for subprime mortgages. See id. (citing E. Gareth Plank, director of USB
Securities LLC in San Francisco). Another estimate is a profit margin of % to 1% for
conventional loans, but almost 3% for subprime loans. See Simon Barker-Benfield,
"Subprime" Lending Pays Better Profits, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 16, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Flatun File (citing Mark Zandi, chief economist for Regional
Financial Associates of West Chester, Pennsylvania). Higher servicing costs for subprime
loans will reduce the profit differential somewhat. See infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text. However, it is clear that subprime loans are extremely profitable.
19. See Scott Leith and Jim Weiker, High-Risk Lender, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec.
20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24032312.
20. See id.
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and is therefore a more costly process than servicing prime loans.2
Subprime lenders monitor payments closely and some even call
borrowers monthly to remind them to make their payments.2" The
average cost of servicing a subprime loan is about four times the cost
of servicing a conventional loan.23
The subprime credit decision process seeks to differentiate
chronic delinquents from those borrowers whose credit problems were
caused by job loss or illness.24 Those borrowers, whose credit
problems are due to temporary circumstances, rather than a lifetime of
bad finances, are the safest customers. Subprime lenders focus on
factors including income level, employment history, and the reasons
behind past delinquencies or high levels of credit card debt in deciding
whether to make a loan to a consumer.25
Subprime companies finance their loans differently than banks
involved in conventional lending. While banks can use customer
deposits to fund their loans,26 subprime lenders typically must borrow
the money they need to make loans.27 Thus, subprime lenders make
money on the spread between the high interest rates they charge
customers and the interest that they must pay to get the capital they
need to make new loans. 2' Another important difference between
conventional bank loans and subprime loans is that subprime
companies rely almost exclusively on a practice known as
21securitization. Securitization is a process in which the lender
21. See Diana Bosetti, Risky Business Lenders Find Opportunity in Subprime Market,
ORANGE COUNTY Bus. J., March 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9333020.
22. See id.
23. See Dona DeZube, The Stress of Subprime Servicing, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct.
1998, at 103, 103 (discussing the costs and labor involved in servicing subprime loans).
24. See Bosetti, supra note 21.
25. See id.
26. See Paul Muolo, Subprime Meltdown: A Time to Buy?, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1998,
at 78, 82 [hereinafter Muolo, Subprine Meltdown]. Because of FDIC insurance, deposits
are a risk-free investment for customers. Therefore, banks pay a relatively low interest
rate to "borrow" from their customers. Banks thus have access to a cheap supply of
capital.
27. See Skelly, supra note 9. Subprime lenders pay more interest than banks do
because they must borrow to fund their loans, whereas banks use customer deposits to
fund their loans. See id.
28. See id.
29. See generally Steven Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (1993) (discussing the technique of securitization).
Securitizations, or structured financings as they are also called, began in the early 1970's.
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repackages pools of loans as securities and sells them to investors.3 o
The investor, rather than the original lender, thus bears the risk that
the borrower will default.3" This process provides the subprime lender
with a revolving source of capital with which to make new loans.32
Therefore, if the lender is successful in selling its loans, it will not
have to rely on banks to extend it as much additional capital with
which to make new loans.
III. RECENT PROBLEMS IN THE SUBPRIME INDUSTRY
A number of factors have contributed to the recent decline in
the health of the subprime industry. Increased competition is one of
the most important factors. In 1994, there were only ten companies in
the subprime lending business.33 By March of 1998, that figure had
grown to fifty. 34 Increased competition in the subprime market caused
deterioration in overall credit quality. 35 The proliferation of subprime
lenders forced companies to go deeper into the credit pool to find
customers. 36 This reduction in credit quality has increased the risk of
default.37 Moreover, consumer defaults have been on the rise as the
average American has taken on an increasing amount of debt. 31 The
industry was also hurt by the entrance of inexperienced subprime
lenders who incorrectly evaluated customers' credit ratings and
thereby made bad loan decisions. 39 As the stock prices of subprime
lenders dropped because of financial difficulties, institutions were less
willing to provide the capital to subprime companies to finance further
See id. at 3. One of the primary goals of the securitization process is to "insulate the
securitized assets from the credit and bankruptcy risk of the originator of the assets."
Carla E. Craig and R. Kenneth MacCallum, Recent Bankruptcy Filings Raise New
Concerns for Investors, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 1998, at 5.
30. See Greg Ip, Credit Crunches Aren't What They Used to Be, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7,
1998, at A18.
31. See id.
32. See Skelly, supra note 9.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Pate et al., supra note 9. This article deals primarily with problems in the
subprime auto loan market, but the problems are not unique to this segment.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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loans.4"
Increased competition also forced lenders to lower rates to stay
competitive.41 This decreased the spread between the interest that
borrowers paid to the subprime companies and the interest that the
companies paid other institutions for access to capital. 4' Also,
continuously falling interest rates have enabled borrowers to pay off
loans sooner than lenders had anticipated by refinancing their existing
loans at a lower rate.43 This increase in prepayments caused the
investors that buy securitized loans to demand higher rates, thereby
cutting the profit margin of subprime lenders.44
Subprime delinquencies are on the rise even though
unemployment is low and home prices and incomes are increasing.4"
Competition is pushing lenders to go for even higher loan-to-value
ratios, ultimately resulting in inadequate levels of collateral being kept
to back loans.46 Consumer debt and personal bankruptcies are
reaching the highest levels in history,47 despite the strength of the
American economy over the past few years. Credit card defaults are
rising as well.48 Some industry observers question whether current
lending practices will seem reasonable if the economy takes a
downturn.49 In a recession, subprime borrowers will find it even
harder to make their loan payments. An outbreak of delinquencies
could result.
Subprime lenders use an accounting technique known as gain-
on-sale accounting to calculate the value of that portion of the loan
pool that is retained by the lender.5 0 The securitization transaction and
40. See id. at 6.
41. See Skelly, supra note 9.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Ip, supra note 30, at A18.
45. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 17.
46. See id.
47. See id. In 1997, 1.4 million Americans filed for bankruptcy, double the number
from ten years earlier. See Williams Warns Banks on Consumer Credit, Points to
Weakening Underwriting Standards, 71 Banking Rep. (BNA) 503 (Oct.5, 1998).
48. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 17.
49. See id. On the other hand, others point out that a recession might benefit the
subprime industry by creating new subprime borrowers. See id.
50. Barry Conger, Lenders Assess Impact of FAS 125, REAL EST. FIN. TODAY, THE
ELECTRONIC EDITION, Nov. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7566816. Subprime lenders
do not necessarily sell the entire pool of loans. They may retain a small piece of the pool
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retention of the residual is accounted for as a sale. 5 An accounting,
rule known as FAS 125 "requires that mortgage companies that
securitize mortgage pools ... determine the fair market value of the
asset and calculate the book gains realized after accounting for
costs." 52 Fair market value of this type of asset is difficult to pinpoint
because it rests on a variety of assumptions. 53 Accountants must make
assumptions about four factors: estimated rate of prepayments, the
number of default rates, loss severity, and the discount rate associated
with the securitization.
If reality does not match initial assumptions, then a subprime
lender's actual earnings will be lower than expected earnings, and its
credit rating will slip. 5  In previous years, when interest rates
remained stable and there was not much competition in the industry,
this accounting technique resulted in excellent earnings. 56 Recently,
however, subprime lenders have had to sharply restate earnings
downward because of bad loans and loan prepayments. 7 The damage
done to stock prices has forced some subprime lenders to look for a
buyer.5
Wall Street has provided much of the funding for the subprime
industry.59 The recent crisis in foreign markets and the wild swings in
that remains on their books as an asset. See Pate et al., supra note 9. This retained
interest in the loan pool is known as the residual. See Interview with Brian E. Simpson,
Managing Director, Structured Products Group, First Union, in Charlotte, N.C. (Dec. 17,
1998) [hereinafter Simpson Interview]. According to Simpson, although the residual
represents a small percentage of the loan pool, a large portion of the lender's profits
comes from the residual. See id.
51. See Simpson Interview, supra note 48.
52. See Conger, supra note 48.
53. See id.
54. See id. If any one of these assumption factors is off even a small amount, the
asset's value will vary greatly. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Skelly, supra note 9. In 1997, Mercury Finance, a subprime car lender, saw
its market value drop from $2.2 billion to $130 million after the company announced that
it had overstated profits. See id.
58. See Rick Brooks & Stephen E. Frank, First Union Agrees to Buy Money Store,
WALL ST. J., March 5, 1998, at A3. Cityscape Financial Corp.'s stock price went from
$32 to zero; Southern Pacific Funding from $18 to zero; Pacific America Money Center
from $28 to $1; FirstPlus Financial, one of the giants of the HLTV industry, from $62 to
$2.50, before coming back up to $5. See Muolo, Subprime Meltdown, supra note 26, at
78.
59. See Liz Pulliam, Sub-prime Lenders Feel Pinch, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
1999]
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the U.S. stock market have caused banks and other financial
institutions to shy away from risky ventures.60 Subprime lenders that
sell off their loans must rely on capital from banks and brokerages to
keep operating between the time loans are originated and sold. 6'
Subprime lenders are being hit doubly hard in the current market:
institutional investors who had been buying the securitized loans are
looking for safer investments and banks and brokerage houses are
refusing to extend any more credit to subprime lenders because of
fears of financial instability in the industry. 62 If this trend continues,
then lenders will have no one to borrow from in order to make loans
and no one to sell the loans to even if they can be originated. Some in
the industry feel that subprime lending will shift to "larger better-
financed companies that can provide their own funding." 63
IV. FIRST UNION'S ATTRACTION TO THE MONEY STORE
First Union's acquisition of The Money Store closed on June
30, 1998.' The acquisition will make First Union the nation's biggest
home-equity lender as well as a major force in student loans 65 and
small business lending.66 The Money Store has had phenomenal profit
Oct. 13, 1998, at 6D.
60. See id. Economic problems in Asia and Russia have scared many investors away
from securitized loan pools and into safer instruments such as Treasury bills. See Mary
Kane Newhouse, Equity Industry's Woes Will Further limit Borrowers' Choices, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24032314.
61. See Pulliam, supra note 59, at 6D.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. FIRST UNION, 1998 SECOND QUARTER REPORT 2 (1998) (visited Jan. 25, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data136995/0000950168-98-O02707.txt>. The
Money Store was founded in 1967 and has 4800 employees and 172 offices dispersed
throughout all 50 states. See Skelly, supra note 9. In 1997, The Money Store lent more
than $7.5 billion, which was up 50% from 1996. See id. The Money Store currently has
three major segments of business: home equity loans, small business and commercial
loans, and student loans. See Simpson Interview, supra note 50. Prior to late 1997, The
Money Store also originated subprime auto loans, but these did not perform well. See id.
The Money Store still services previously originated auto loans, but does not originate
new ones. See id. The Money Store is the largest Small Business Administration lender
in the nation. See id. In fact its small business portfolio is larger than that of the next
four or five largest lenders combined. See id.
65. See Simpson Interview, supra note 50. The Money Store is among the ten largest
student lenders. See id. It focuses on marketing its loans to the financial aid offices of
universities rather than to the individual student. See id.
66. See Brooks & Frank, supra note 58, at A3. The Money Store has been the
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growth over the past five years, with profits in 1992 around $15
million, increasing by 1997 to $124.5 million, a 25% return on
equity.67 First Union expects The Money Store's earnings and
revenue to grow about 20 % annually.
68
The Money Store was acquired as an operating subsidiary of
First Union National Bank,6 9 will retain its name, and will operate as a
separate unit within First Union's consumer group.70 The acquisition
will allow the combined entities to reduce some operating expenses by
integrating basic overlapping staff functions. 7' First Union plans to
securitize the loans that the Money Store originates.72  The Money
Store will keep its name, management, and offices and will operate as
part of the First Union division that handles consumer loans, credit
cards, and electronic banking.73  First Union will handle
securitizations for loans originated by The Money Store through its
capital markets group. 74
Even before acquiring The Money Store, First Union was
already involved in the subprime lending business, through First
Union Home Equity Corp. 75 The strategy had been to keep A and A
minus loans 76 in its own portfolio, while packaging its subprime loans
nation's largest Small Business Administration lender since 1983. See Ken Elkins, Money
Store Still Leads All SBA Lenders in State, Bus. J. (Charlotte) at 11.
67. See Fishing Downmarket, supra note 3, at 81.
68. See Brooks & Frank, supra note 58, at A3. The expected 20% growth rate is
only half of what actual growth has been over the past five years. See id.
69. See OCC Conditional Approval 280, Decision of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency on the Application by First Union National Bank, Charlotte, North Carolina,
To Acquire The Money Store, Inc., and Its Direct and Indirect Operating Subsidiaries
(OCC Interpretative Letter Service, July 1998), at 10-11 (June 29, 1998) [hereinafter
OCC decision].
70. Mary Vandeveire, Money Store Banks on Conventional Loans, Bus. J.-PHOENIX
& THE VALLEY OF THE SUN, March 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7370078. According
to Brian Simpson, First Union's strategy is to operate the Money Store as "a stand-alone
entity focused on loan origination and loan servicing." Simpson Interview, supra note 50.
71. See Simpson Interview, supra note 50.
72. Heather Timmons, 1st Union Exec Sees Lots to Learn from Money Store, AM.
BANKER, March 11, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter Timmons, 1st Union Exec] (citing James
Maynor, chief executive of First Union Mortgage Corp.).
73. See Skelly, supra note 9.
74. Heather Timmons, First Union Poised to Storm Home Equity Securitizing, AM.
BANKER, April 22, 1998, at 8.
75. Eric Avidon, First Union Home Equity Grows Through MBS and Its Portfolio,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, December 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn
File.
76. "A" or "A minus" denotes prime or conventional loans. See Frey, supra note
1999]
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and selling them as securities." Banks have traditionally shied away
from high-risk lending and thus First Union only began making B and
C loans in 1994.78 Because of the growth of the asset-backed
securities market, First Union is now able to securitize B and C credit
loans which leads to increased capital and thus increased ability to
originate more loans.79
However, even with the reality of securitization, First Union
was doing mainly B and B minus loans rather than the riskier C
loans.80 First Union executives felt that they could learn a great deal
from The Money Store's thirty-one years of subprime experience.8"
First Union now feels more comfortable going lower on the credit
scale.82 Because of its years of experience in the subprime market,
The Money Store was better "able to separate risk deeper down in the
credit spectrum" than First Union. 8 The Money Store deal gave First
Union greater access and involvement in this profitable segment of the
lending business.84
First Union's acquisition of The Money Store was timely. The
subprime industry had some serious problems in 1998.8" First Union
paid $34 per share for The Money Store, totaling $2.1 billion.86 If
First Union had acquired The Money Store at its 52-week high price,
it would have had to pay $4 billion. 87 By waiting until The Money
Store lost a large portion of its market capitalization value, First Union
was able to acquire one of the giants of the subprime industry at a
16, at 1D. Those borrowers with a grade of less than A minus are deemed subprime. See
id. A variety of factors including income, debt level, payment history, and employment
history determine a consumer's credit rating. See id.
77. See Avidon, supra note 75.
78. See id.
79. See id. (citing Chris Oddleifson, president of First Union Home Equity Corp.).
80. See id. (citing Jim Maynor, chief executive of First Union Mortgage Corp.).
81. See Timmons, 11 Union Exec, supra note 72, at 8.
82. See id.
83. See First Union Exec Lays Foundation for Money Store Acquisition, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn File (quoting
Chris Oddleifson, president of First Union Home Equity Corp.).
84. See Skelly, supra note 9.
85. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
86. See Vandeveire, supra note 70.
87. See Lawrence Richter Quinn, The Buying Up of Subprime, MORTGAGE BANKING,
April 1, 1998, at 35, 38.
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discount."8
First Union was enticed by the opportunity to expand its
markets geographically.8 9 The Money Store has a great deal of
national exposure, including such areas as California and New
England, regions where First Union does not have branches. 90 The
Money Store acquisition will also allow First Union to expand its
customer base for services such as secured credit cards and life
insurance. 9' First Union will distribute its credit cards through The
Money Store's nationwide network. 92 As the credit records of these
subprime borrowers improve, First Union can offer them other loans
and services. 93 Previously, First Union turned down about half of its
loan applicants because their credit history was not good enough. 9 4
First Union can simply refer these customers to The Money Store's
loan products. 95
According to First Union, shareholders have no cause to worry
about the acquisition because The Money Store's portfolio is not very
risky.96 The government guarantees most of the student and business
loans.97 Furthermore, First Union plans to keep only 3% of The
Money Store's loans. 98 The rest will be repackaged and sold off to
investors. 99 Also, First Union has installed software that monitors
high-risk loan accounts and helps predict customer bankruptcies.' 00
This type of software should be especially useful in dealing in the
high-risk credit market. First Union expects that the acquisition will
88. See id.
89. See First Union Exec Lays Foundation for Money Store Acquisition, supra note
83.
90. See id.
91. See Skelly, supra note 9.
92. See Quinn, supra note 87, at 38.
93. See Skelly, supra note 9.
94. See id. (citing Jack Antononi, First Union's top consumer credit official).
95. See id. According to Brian Simpson, a First Union executive, it will not matter
whether customers initially contact First Union or The Money Store when seeking a loan.
See Simpson Interview, supra note 48. Customers will have their credit rated under
uniform criteria and will be offered the best loan for which they qualify. See id.
96. See Fishing Downmarket, supra note 3, at 81.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Hidden Engine: Technology,
WALL ST. J., April 23, 1998, at B9.
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add about three cents per share to 1998 earnings (previously estimated
$3.78) and a minimum of six to eight cents in 1999 (previously
estimated at $4.36). 11 Even with The Money Store in its camp, First
Union's subprime appetite may not yet be satisfied. First Union is
reportedly among the potential buyers for Amresco Inc., another
subprime lender. 0
2
The shareholders of The Money Store should be pleased with
the acquisition as well. The Money Store's stock price had dropped
more than 25% because of "investors' concerns about credit quality,
accelerating loan prepayments, negative cash flow, and stiff
competition." 0 3 The Money Store needed help from a banking giant.
Because of the acquisition by First Union, The Money Store will have
cheaper access to capital as well as a broader product line, including
credit cards and other consumer loan products.0 4 First Union has
enough capital so that The Money Store will be able to weather the
liquidity crisis that has decimated other subprime lenders. 105 Loans
generated by the Money Store will be securitized under First Union's
higher credit rating, thus decreasing the cost of the capital needed to
finance the loans. 0 6  Ultimately, The Money Store's shareholders
received a good deal, as First Union paid relatively close to the asking
price of $2.25 billion. 7
Banks had traditionally shied away from subprime lending
because of the risk.'0 8 However, with the rise of securitization of
subprime loans, banks can become involved in the market. 0 9
101. See Brooks & Frank, supra note 58, at A3. Not everyone is convinced that the
acquisition will add to First Union's bottom line. There is some concern that high rates of
prepayment will cause headaches for First Union. See Skelly, supra note 9. This
argument seems misplaced, because even during times of soaring prepayment rates, The
Money Store has remained relatively financially healthy compared to other subprime
lenders. See Simpson Interview, supra note 50. This could be evidence that The Money
Store has learned how to keep its customers from refinancing loans with other lenders.
102. See Heather Timmons, In Brief. Amresco Up 30% Takeover Talk, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 8, 1999, at 20.
103. See Skelly, supra note 9.
104. See id.
105. See Anderson, supra note 3.
106. See Skelly, supra note 9.
107. See Money Store Confirms That It's Seeking a Buyer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,
1998, available in 1998 WL-WSJ 3483813.
108. See Skelly, supra note 9.
109. See id.
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Securitization allows banks to originate loans, but transfer much of the
risk to investors who buy pieces of the loan pools. "o Other banks
besides First Union have become bigger players in the subprime
market recently."' Barnett Banks, recently acquired by NationsBank,
entered the subprime market by acquiring Equicredit Corp. in 1994.112
Norwest Finance owns Fidelity Acceptance Corp., a subprime
lender.113  Key Corp. of Cleveland agreed to acquire Champion
Mortgage Co., a subprime lender, for about $200 million.114  Other
banks such as Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Countrywide Credit
Industries entered the subprime arena by forming their own subprime
divisions. 1's
V. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO BANK INVOLVEMENT IN SUBPRIME
LENDING
Banks that want to acquire a subprime lender must receive
approval from the appropriate regulatory body. 116 As a national bank,
First Union had to apply to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) for permission to acquire The Money Store and
operate it as a subsidiary of the national bank. 7  In evaluating First
Union's application, the OCC examined The Money Store's activities
to determine whether they are permissible for a national bank." 8
Notably, the OCC stated that The Money Store was "engaged in
making, purchasing, selling, servicing or warehousing loans...
including consumer loans, commercial loans, residential mortgage
110. See id; see also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (for an introductory
discussion of securitization).
111. See Karen Talley, Consolidation is Changing the Face of the Industry, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 24, 1995, at 25; Quinn, supra note 87, at 37; Brooks & Frank, supra note
58, at A3; Skelly, supra note 9.
112. See Talley, supra note 111, at 25.
113. See Quinn, supra note 87, at 37.
114. See Brooks & Frank, supra note 58, at A3.
115. See Skelly, supra note 9. Banks that form their own subprime division, rather
than acquiring an existing lender, may not like the results. See Quinn, supra note 87, at
37. Both Fleet and Bank of America sold the subprime divisions that they started. See id.
Banks lacking subprime expertise might benefit more from buying an experienced
subprime lender. See id.
116. See, e.g., OCC Decision, supra note 69.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 2-3.
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loans, and commercial mortgage loans." " 9 The OCC determined that
these activities were permissible for a national bank. 120  The OCC
approved the acquisition on June 29, 1998121 and will be able to
directly supervise The Money Store since it was acquired by a national
bank.1
2 2
The OCC has urged banks "to maintain sensible underwriting
standards for consumer credit products, saying an economic downturn
could expose lurking problems."' 23 Even during one of the greatest
economic expansions in American history, debt levels are high, higher
risk loans are growing, and the number of personal bankruptcies are
increasing.24  Home equity and subprime mortgage loans require
sound underwriting and administration. 12' A loan that seems
adequately collateralized when originated may turn out to be risky if
there is a downturn in real estate markets. 126 Also, costs associated
with foreclosure and marketing are so high that any part of a mortgage
loan that exceeds 85% to 90% of the home's appraised value is the
equivalent of the ill advised practice of extending unsecured credit at
secured prices. 127
The OCC will soon publish guidelines that will give banks
instruction in managing subprime lending. 121 The guidelines will
encourage banks to hire management that has experience in subprime
lending. 129 The OCC will require that banks explicitly define their
standards for each credit grade and adhere to those standards. 30
119. Id. at2.
120. See id. at 2 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(ii)(L) and 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(g)
(providing that a national bank may securitize and sell assets that it holds)).
121. See id. at 10-11.
122. See Brian Collins, OCC Steps Up Surveillance of Bank's Subprime Lending,
NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS, June 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn
File.
123. Williams Warns Banks on Consumer Credit, Points to Weakening Undenvrihing
Standards, supra note 47, at 503.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See OCC Publishing Subprime Guidelines, NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 26,
1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn File.
129. See Jaret Seiberg, Policies on Loan Chargeoffs, Subprime Lending Expected, AM
BANKER, Oct. 20, 1998, at 2.
130. See id.
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Banks must price subprime loans based on risk rather than on the rates
the competition is charging."'3 The agency has cautioned banks to be
careful in verifying the financial information of subprime customers.'32
The OCC will also caution banks not to allow customers to skip
payments. 1
33
The FDIC was the first regulatory agency to warn banks about
the dangers of subprime lending. 134 A 1997 FDIC letter warned of the
risks of default in the subprime lending industry, stressing the
importance of being able to differentiate accurately between relative
credit risk levels. 135  The FDIC also cautioned that management
expertise and operational controls are crucial in this higher risk
area. 36  Furthermore, for loans purchased from a dealer or broker,
"banks must know the lending criteria used by the originating entity,
the nature of service agreements and warranty contracts, and any other
relevant item concerning the transactions." 137 The FDIC is looking
into possible risky activities in the subprime market and will likely
raise deposit insurance premiums for those institutions that pose a
threat to insured funds. 13
8
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has cautioned that
the "drive to stretch traditional loan underwriting criteria is
intensifying, and ... must be handled carefully." '39 Greenspan
warned the industry not to engage in excessively risky lending
practices that would risk their financial well being. 140 He pointed to
evidence that certain loans to low and moderate income borrowers
131. See id.
132. See id. Acting Comptroller Julie Williams stated, in a recent speech, that "no one
wins when individuals receive too much credit or credit they cannot afford." Jeffrey
Marshall, Cracking Down On Subprime, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1998, at 20, 20.
133. See Seiberg, supra note 129, at 2.
134. See FDIC Frets Over Risks in Subprime Lending, BANKING POL'Y REP., June 2,
1997, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Bnkpol File.
135. See FDIC Interpretative Letter, FIL-44-97 (May 2, 1997), available in LEXIS,
Bankng Library, FDIC file.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See Donna Tanoue, Making the Risk-Takers Pay, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct.
12, 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn File. Donna Tanoue is the chair of
the FDIC. See id.
139. Alan Greenspan, Remarks at a Community Forum on Community Reinvestment
and Access to Credit: California's Challenge, Los Angeles, California (Jan. 12, 1998)
(transcript), available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fedsp File.
140. See id.
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have shown unfavorable delinquency rates.' 4' He also noted that
liberal lending policies might not be in the best interests of consumers
if they are given credit that they ultimately cannot afford. 142
Federal organizations such as the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are looking into suspected
abusive lending practices of subprime lenders in the areas of
disclosure, underwriting, marketing, and pricing of loans. 143 The
subprime market serves a relatively larger portion of minority and
low-income borrowers than does the conventional market. 144
Therefore, the industry may feel more pressure from regulators, who
want to protect historically disadvantaged groups from dishonest
lending practices. 145 Banks, currently engaging in subprime lending or
which are considering acquiring subprime lenders, must be vigilant in
monitoring possible lending abuses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the consolidation in the financial services sector as
a whole, only those companies with a low cost structure will be able to
141. See id.
142. See id. Greenspan noted that access to credit can be beneficial in that it allows
low and moderate income families to buy homes and other goods and deal with
emergencies. However, if lower income borrowers undergo financial troubles such as job
loss, illness, or unexpected repairs, they may not have the means to pay back their loans.
See Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Economic Development Conference of the
Greenlining Institute, San Francisco, California (Oct. 11, 1997) (transcript), available in
LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fedsp File.
143. See Hube, supra note 9, at Cl (citing Lee Douglass, Justice Department
spokeswoman). Examples of some possible abusive practices are: equity stripping (where
a loan is made based on the value of the property rather than the customers ability to
repay), packing (where lenders tack on extra fees), and flipping (when a lender
encourages a borrower to keep refinancing which earns the lender additional origination
fees). See Lesley Mitchell, Feds Seek Records of S.L. Lender; But Mt. Olympus Financial
Refuses to Comply with FTC; Feds Want Look at Records of S.L. Lender, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Nov. 4, 1998, at D5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sltrib File. The FTC
and DOJ are currently probing Associates First Capital Corp. alleging such abuses as
lending more than the borrower will be able to repay, tacking on high fees and
unnecessary insurance to mortgage totals, and making "balloon" loans that the borrower
will not be able to repay. See Associates First Capital Is a Part of U.S. Probe Of
Subprime Lending, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B22.
144. See Bosetti, supra note 21 (citing the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council of Freddie Mac).
145. See id.
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compete effectively. 146  Although banks that make the foray into
subprime lending have the advantage of cheaper capital with which to
make loans, non-bank subprime lenders need not be overly concerned
about the competition. 147 Banks that start up subprime divisions often
find it more expensive to service subprime loans. 148 This is one reason
why banks might acquire subprime lenders and keep them as a
separate division. Banks have cheaper access to capital, but the
acquired lender has more experience in the subprime field and will
probably be able to service these loans more cheaply.
Because of the cheaper lending capital available to acquired
lenders such as The Money Store and because of the increased
competition in the industry, non-bank subprime lenders may have to
find a bank to acquire them in order to stay competitive. 149 Another
benefit of mergers between banks and subprime lenders is that each
entity can now market products to a larger customer base. 150 Almost
every subprime lender and servicer would be amenable to a merger if
the deal was fair. "'
Widespread consolidation and acquisition of subprime lenders
is a likely outcome of the current economic climate. 1s2 Many
subprime lenders started up at a time when capital was cheaper and
profits in the industry were high. 15 3 The proliferation of entrants into
the subprime market has resulted in intense competition resulting in
lower rates."5 4 This rate competition has allowed consumers to shop
around and thus prepay higher rate loans, thereby hurting the profits
of the original lender. 55  Because of falling interest rates and
increased competition, subprime lenders cannot count on holding onto
146. See Skelly, supra note 9.
147. See Heather Timmons, NationsBank, Chase Get Set To Securitize Subprime
Loans, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 1997, at 18.
148. See id. In fact, some banks that have begun their own subprime divisions have
eventually sold them off because the banks lacked sufficient expertise in the area. See
supra note 115 and accompanying text.
149. See Deidra Darsa, Money Store Purchase May Spur Acquisition Spree, REAL EST.
FIN. TODAY, THE ELECTRONIC EDITION, Mar. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7566544
(citing Christine Clifford, vice president of Wholesale Access in Columbia, Md).
150. See Skelly, supra note 9.
151. See Quinn, supra note 87, at 36.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 36-37.
154. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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loans for five years. "' A rapid rise in prepayments forced many
subprime lenders to adjust their quarterly earnings reports
downward.'57
Banks are likely to be the chief acquirers of subprime lenders
because they are generally familiar with running finance companies or
subprime divisions. i 8 Now that subprime lenders are looking for
acquirers, banks can have a subprime division that has already
developed expertise in that specific area. 159  Banks are shopping
around for a variety of reasons."'6 Banks have had a great deal of cash
recently and have been on the lookout for profitable additions to their
business.' The return on assets is much better for subprime lenders
than for conventional lenders.162 Subprime lenders are currently good
deals because their stock prices have suffered. 63  Banks can more
easily securitize subprime loans than conventional loans because of the
greater spread between interest received from the customer and
interest paid on the capital to finance the loan.' 64 Finally, banks want
to reach new customer bases in order to offer these consumers
traditional bank products and services. 165  Low funding costs will
allow banks to continue to realize a profit even if subprime interest
rates decrease in future years.166
Existing subprime companies might merge with each other
rather than being acquired by larger financial institutions such as
banks. 167 There is some uncertainty as to whether banks will be able
to stay in the subprime business because they may be hesitant to go too
156. Howard Crise, Subprime Lenders Scramble To Tackle Prepayment Fallout, REAL
EST. FIN. TODAY, THE ELECTRONIC EDITION, Aug. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7566714.
157. See id.
158. See Quinn, supra note 87, at 37. Banks will not be the only entities vying for
subprime lenders. Mortgage banks, thrifts, other finance companies, and insurance
companies are also potential buyers. See id. at 38.
159. See Quinn, supra note 87, at 37.
160. See id.
161. See id
162. See id. at 37-38.
163. See id. at 38.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 17.
167. See id. at 19 (citing Stephen Wright, president of WMC Mortgage Corp., in
Woodland Hills, California).
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low in credit quality and will not be able to tolerate the high
delinquency rate. 168  Although in coming months the situation may
change, The Money Store is currently the only top ten subprime lender
that is owned by a commercial bank. 169 Industry analysts doubt that
small subprime companies will survive the liquidity crunch, 170 and
therefore they predict that "large well-capitalized institutions will
dominate the subprime business in years ahead." 171
In the final analysis, banks will be searching for subprime
lenders like The Money Store. The Money Store has a nationwide
network of lending offices with a great deal of name recognition and
thirty-one years of experience in the business. The lender has shown
consistent growth over the past five years. Its stock price had fallen
off of its highs, but was not so low as to scare First Union away.
Large banks should consider acquiring a lender like The Money Store
for two main reasons. First, subprime loans generate high profits for
the lender.' 72 Second, securtization has decreased the economic risks
for companies that lend to consumers with bad credit. 173  Marc
Turtletaub, the president of The Money Store agrees that the "logical
evolution of the [subprime] business [is] to be a division of a very
large bank." 74
The subprime lending business is not for the faint of heart nor
is it for those without access to a great deal of capital. Growth in the
subprime industry has coincided with an excellent American economy.
No one knows for sure what would happen if the economy hit a
168. See id. at 20 (citing Scott Reading, president of AMRESCO Residential Credit in
Ontario, California). Banks should be able to tolerate the higher risks because the
financial rewards are greater.
169. See Paul Muolo, Subprime Loans Remain Healthy Through Second Quarter,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Sept. 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Nmn File.
170. See Gwendolyn Glenn, Downturn Is Not Uniform Disaster, REAL EST. FIN.
TODAY, THE ELECTRONIC EDITION, Jan. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8483891.
171. Marc Hochstein & Heather Timmons, First Tennessee and Wells Fargo Muscle
Up in Subprime Mortgages, AM. BANKER, Jan. 7, 1999, at 1 (citing Judith Berry,
president of Directors Acceptance, the subprime division of Wells Fargo's Norwest
Mortgage unit). Because so many smaller subprime lenders are likely to be swallowed up
or go out of business, there will be less credit available to consumers with low credit
ratings. See Newhouse, supra note 60.
172. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. Of course, the risk of default
remains present, but the brunt of the impact of default is borne by the investors who buy
pools of loans, rather than the lender that originates the loans. See id.
174. Anderson, supra note 3.
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recession, or even something less than a recession. The acquisition of
subprime lenders, as well as the formation of subprime divisions
within banks, is best undertaken only by the large banks who can
afford the losses that might accompany this risky business in harsher
times. The regulators will probably not be so quick to restrict banks'
subprime activities as long as the banks that are the biggest players are
also the biggest banks.
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